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WEEKLY REPORT

PREPARED EXCLUSIVEL

FOR THE

SÉNIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROU

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1. UGANDA

President Obote's tough suppression of the Buganda rebellion has aroused bitter animosity among many Baganda but is probably supported by a majority of the country.

The other tribes of Uganda have long resented Buganda's attitude of superiority, the special privileges of its wealthy chiefs, and its autonomy under the former federal constitution. Obote had hoped to end Buganda's special status without bloodshed when he rammed the new constitution through the National Assembly in April. It effectively stripped the Baganda elite of their prerogatives but left the Kabaka's position intact. Many Ugandans, including younger elements in Buganda, welcomed the reforms as long overdue.

A militant minority of Bagandan leaders apparently convinced the Kabaka that an armed showdown with Obote was necessary. Bagandan veterans were given weapons training, automatic arms stolen from the central government armory were stockpiled in the palace, and finally the central government was given ten days to vacate Kampala, the national capital within Buganda's territory. The Kabaka apparently hoped that by forcing Obote to make the first move he could incite a Bagandan uprising and perhaps invite outside intervention.

Faced with a direct challenge to central authority, Obote arrested the militant Bagandan leaders and stormed the palace. Although the Kabaka escaped arrest, most of his armed irregulars were killed and their arms seized. The Baganda—short of arms and lacking leadership—may not wish to continue the fight for long in the face of severe police repression and government intimidation. Moreover, the Kabaka's increasingly tribalistic moves at the expense of Uganda's unity have lost him whatever support he might have had outside Buganda. Nevertheless, Bagandan political opposition and sporadic harassment will continue to be a festering problem for Obote.

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2. CYPRUS

Greek-Turkish bilateral talks may soon resume. Initial contacts are planned during the NATO ministerial conference in Brussels about 9 June. Both countries appear sincere in their desire to reopen the dialogue, but have so far shown no willingness to offer the concessions necessary to get negotiations off dead center.

Developments on Cyprus will complicate even this tentative effort. Already the Greek Cypriot press has launched a campaign impugning Greek motives for agreeing to resume the talks.

President Makarios continues to show his independence of Athens and of General Grivas, the Greek officer who commands the Cypriot armed forces.

Officer who communes the cyptics armed reserve	
The immediate bone of contention concerns Makarios' efforts to win control over the Cypriot National Guard away from Grivas. The issue presumably was discussed during the Cypriot foreign minister's talks in Athens this past weekend (28-29 May).	25X1
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The Turks have also warned again that they might intervene unless a way is soon found to improve conditions for the Turkish Cypriot community.	
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3. INDIA-PAKISTAN

Relations between India and Pakistan continue to deteriorate, with each blaming the other for violating "the spirit of Tashkent." Soviet diplomats in South Asia have indicated that Moscow is not presently prepared to make an effort to reverse this trend.

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A new confrontation with India might also help the government divert public interest in Pakistan from recent agitation over political freedom and the rising cost of living. There also are indications that Rawalpindi may again be examining the possibility of taking the Kashmir issue to the UN Security Council.

The Indian attitude toward Pakistan has also been affected by continuing tribal insurgency in eastern India. The press in New Delhi has charged the Pakistanis are providing advice and weapons to the rebels. On other issues, as well, Indian propaganda against Pakistan has reached its highest level since Tashkent.

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4. CUBA

Fidel Castro's overreaction to the recent incidents at Guantanamo appears designed to divert attention from Cuba's economic difficulties and still popular dissension.

Sugar production will total about 4.5 million tons, compared with slightly more than 6.0 million tons in 1965. Sugar provides between 85 and 90 percent of Cuba's foreign exchange earnings, so the reduced harvest will compel a cut in the level of imports, including foodstuffs. Increased aid from the Soviet Union will compensate in good part for lower foreign exchange income and the reduction in imports probably will be moderate over the year.

For the moment, however, the lower level of imports, coinciding with the absence of any increase in domestic food production, accounts for the shortages in available food supplies. Rice supplies, in particular, have been badly hurt and the monthly ration has been cut from six pounds per person to three. While the reduction in rice supplies probably has been partly compensated for by increased availability of other grains, the sharp cut in consumption of one of Cuba's basic foods has had a bad psychological effect at a time when the regime has lost much of its mystique.

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5. NIGERIA

The weekend rioting in several northern cities was a direct result of General Ironsi's 24 May announcement replacing the federal system with a unitary government and civil service. Placards carried during the demonstrations demanded that the north secede rather than submit to a unitary government. A unified civil service would mean more southerners in northern government jobs, and fear of this sparked the rioting.

The government alerted police and army units even before Ironsi's speech to watch for unfavorable public reaction, but hours elapsed before order was restored. There are indications that the rioting in several cities was coordinated.

Ironsi sent additional police units north, but he appeared calm and confident that his northern governor could handle the situation. Ironsi has kept the army in the background although troops in the north were used.

There has been little reaction to Ironsi's speech in the south, where the changes probably will be accepted as inevitable and necessary. There have been no incidents in the southern provinces in reaction to the rioting, but the killing of southerners in the north may bring reprisals in the south.

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